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Hillhouse: The Federal Reserved Water Doctrine - Application to the Problem

COMMENTS
THE FEDERAL RESERVED WATER DOCTRINE-APPLICATION TO THE PROBLEM OF WATER
FOR OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT*
Much public interest has recently been focused on the
vast quantities of oil shale located in Colorado, Utah and
Wyoming. Extracting oil from the shale will require large
amounts of water. Yet the shale beds are located in one of
the most arid regions of America. Consequently, acquisition
of the water rights that will be needed to produce the oil is
one of the major problems that must be solved before the
oil shale industry can become a reality.
Most of the water in the area has been appropriated
for private use but because much of the oil shale is located
on land that has been withdrawn' from the public domain, it
has been suggested2 that the answer to the water problem
can be found by applying the federal reserved water doctrine.'
An application of the reservation doctrine would result in
a finding that the reservation of public domain operated to
reserve the water needed to develop the oil shale located
within the land. The federal government would have rights
to the waters of the Upper Colorado River Basin that would
This comment was financed by the Water Resources Research Institute of
the University of Wyoming.
1. The terms "withdrawal" and "reservation" will be used interchangeably in
this discussion. The distinction between a reservation and a withdrawal is:
somewhat uncertain, but seems to consist in the assumption that a
withdrawal is of a temporary character and for a public purpose ....
A reservation contemplates a relatively permanent segregation from
the public domain of lands for a special public use. A withdrawal, like
a reservation, if made under valid authority, effectively separates the
lands involved from the public domain, so that they no longer are
subject to disposal under the public land laws unless otherwise provided in the withdrawal act or order.
1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING 143 (1966).
2. In 1959 Under Secretary of the Interior Bennett indicated that the Government might attempt to urge the reservation doctrine as a solution to the
water problems of oil shale development. In responding to a question regarding the ramifications of the reservation doctrine, Bennett in noting
that nearly all streams in the West would be affected stated: "I think that
is certainly true because the watersheds in the Western States generally
are reserved areas, national forests, oil shale withdrawals and all kinds
of withdrawals and reservations. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Irrigation and Reclamation of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 327 (1959) (Emphasis supplied).
3. The federal reserved water doctrine is alternately referred to as the
"reservation doctrine" or the "Pelton doctrine."
*
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be superior to private appropriations made subsequent to
the oil shale withdrawals.
There are significant reasons for the present interest in
oil shale development. In 1946 the United States consumed
1.9 billion barrels of oil and gas or 8% of the proven United
States reserves.4 In 1964 consumption of oil and gas had
increased to 4 billion barrels or 10% of the proven United
States reserves (approximately 38 billion barrels). Demand
had increased 108% while the supply had only increased 61%.'
According to expert forecasts:
the mathematical facts of the normal growth in our
consumption, coupled with a declining rate of new
discoveries of conventional oil and gas deposits, will
bring us within two decades or less to the inexorable
need for new sources of energy.'
Unquestionably, the oil now residing in the marls underlying
Colorado, Utah and Wyoming is a potential source of the
fuel energy that will be needed in the near future." It is
estimated, perhaps optimistically, that the shale in those states
contains 1.5 trillion barrels of oil having a total value of 2.5
trillion dollars.' Approximately 75% of these 'deposits are
in the Piceance Creek Basin of Colorado which contains the
largest quantity of oil recoverable by demonstrated mining
and retorting methods-estimated at 280 billion barrels.'
Although title to some of the oil shale land is presently
clouded by unpatented mining claims dating prior to 1920,
of the land that has no title problems, 72% is owned by the
Government. The federally owned acreage contains 79% of
the oil in place" As a result, the future of the oil shale
industry is dependent largely upon the policy formulated by
4. Hearings on Oil Shale Before the Senate Comm. on interior and Insular
Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1965) (Statement of the Honorable Gordon
Allott, U.S. Senator from Colorado).
5. Id.
6. Hearings on Oil Shale, supra note 4, at 2 (Statement of the Honorable Henry
M. Jackson, U.S. Senator from Washington) (Emphasis supplied).
7. Although the states of Colorado, Utah and Wyoming do not contain all
of the oil shale in the United States, the remaining deposits are so marginal
that they are rarely discussed. Hearings on Oil Shale, supra note 4, at 3
(Statement of the Honorable Frank E. Moss, U.S. Senator from Utah).
8. Dominick, Oil Shale-The Need For A National Policy, 2 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 61 (1967).
9.

BOARD TO THE SECRETARY OF
INTERIOR (transmitted by letter of the Chairman, Joseph L. Fisher, FebINTERIM REPORT OF THE OIL SHALE ADVISORY

ruary 15, 1965).
10. Id. at 3.
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the Government in disposing of the rights to develop federally
controlled lands. In 1872 federal oil shale lands were open to
homesteading with patents conveying mineral rights, until
in 1914, when minerals were reserved from patent." In 1920
the lands were made subject to the Mineral Leasing Act 2
which eliminated claim location as a means of acquiring
rights in oil shale and substitued the leasing provisions applicable to other non-metalliferous minerals. In 1930 President
Hoover, by executive order," "temporarily" withdrew from
lease or other disposal all deposits of oil shale in the United
States and reserved them for purposes of investigation,
examination, and classification. The order provided that
no further applications were to be accepted. Entries, filings
or selections already allowed were to be cancelled prior to
patent if found to be valuable for oil shale. Aside from some
minor mo'difications the order still stands. With the exception of naval oil shale reserves, 4 federally owned oil shale
is completely within the purview of the Department of the
Interior. Secretary of the Interior Udall has recently announced a plan providing for federal leases obtainable for
purposes of research and development.15
Before the Government can materially assist the industry, it and all others involved in the development of oil shale,
must establish a dependable supply of water. Depending upon
the process being considered, estimates of the quantity of
water that will be needed for industrial and municipal uses
range as high as 455,000 acre feet per year for a two million
barrel per day operation. 6 It has been stated so often as
to require no documentation that water is a scarce resource
in the western oil shale states. Water in the Colorado River
11. 30 U.S.C. § 122 (1964).
12. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1964).
13. Text of the order withdrawing oil shale lands is available in 53 Interior
Dec. 127 (1933).
14. In 1916 and 1924 three large tracts of oil shale land in Colorado and Utah
were withdrawn to guaranty oil for future Navy fuel needs. The executive
orders creating the naval petroleum reserves provided that the public lands
embraced therein should be held for the exclusive use and benefit of the
United States.
15. The proposed regulations issued pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920 are designed to improve technology, encourage competition in development and use of oil shale, establish a basis for subsequent competitive
leasing of federal oil shale lands and to encourage participation by companies not favorably situated with respect to oil shale reserves. Applicants
for leases would be required to supply a statement of proposed water needs
and sources of water supply. 32 Fed. Reg. 7086 (1967).
16. Delaney, Water for Oil Shale Development, 43 DENVER L.J. 72, 73 (1966).
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and its tributaries (those of primary utility in developing
oil shale are the Green and White Rivers) is subject to ever
increasing demands in all the states of the Colorado River
Basin, from Wyoming to California. As stated by Governor
Love of Colora:do:
The water needed for the development of an oil shale
industry is now available in the area. Ten years
hence, however, this same water may not be available
to fill domestic and industrial needs in the Piceance
Basin. Oil shale is not "energy in the bank" as some
required for its development
have said, if the water
17
will not be available.
The reservation doctrine is one of the potential avenues of
water acquisition for oil shale development. Because 79
per cent of the oil shale deposits are held by the Government
and because this land has been withdrawn from the public
domain, it might be invoked as a means of circumventing state
created appropriations that present an obstacle to the appropriation of water for oil shale production.
Of course the usual means of acquiring water rights is
by appropriation or purchase. This article is merely an
attempt to anticipate the unexpected by deliniating the legal
aspects of, and economic effects related to, the possible
application of the reservation doctrine to the problem of
acquiring water for oil shale development. An attempt will
be made to demonstrate that while water should be made
available to facilitate the extraction of oil from shale it
should not become available unless those who have invested
in reliance upon state appropriations are compensated for
their losses.
In order to determine whether the principles of the
reservation doctrine are applicable to the oil shale withdrawal and the naval oil shale reserves therein, it is first
necessary to trace the evolution of the doctrine to the present
time. Once that is accomplished, oil shale withdrawals will
be compared with federal land reservations that have operated
to reserve water appurtenant to the reservation. Finally,
the economic justification of the result of the comparison
and the conclusion arrived at will be "discussed.
17. Hearings on Oil Shale Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1965).
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I. THE RESERVATION DOCTRINE
The reservation doctrine is based on the premise that
the United States originally owned all of the land, and all
of the water appurtenant to the land it owned, in sixteen
western states.18 The mere act of admitting the states to
statehood did not grant title to the nonnavigable waters to the
states any more than they acquired title to the public land
on which those waters are located. Thus, unless the United
States has relinquished control or ownership of such lands
and waters, they remain under the plenary power of the
federal government.
A. The Colorado Doctrine
Advocates of the Colorado doctrine"9 contend that the
control of the United States over nonnavigable water was
relinquished by the Desert Land Act"0 and its counterparts.2 '
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement
Co." is relied upon to sustain the contention that federal control was granted to the states. In that case the controversy
involved private appropriators asserting contradictory rights
to water. The issue was whether a homestead patent to
18. The sixteen states include: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. These states are located
on territory acquired by the United States by way of the Louisiana Purchase,
Treaty with French Republic, April 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200; the Oregon Country Treaty, Treaty with Great Britain, June 15, 1846, 9 Stat. 869; the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Treaty with Republic of Mexico, February
2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922; or the Gadsden Purchase, Treaty with Mexico, Dec. 30,
1853, 10 Stat. 1031.
19. For a discussion of the Colorado doctrine see, Note, Federal-State Conflicts
Over the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 967, 974 (1960).
Under the Colorado doctrine it is contended that the United States when
it originally acquired the lands which now comprise the western states,
acquired "only sovereign rights and with transfer of sovereignty the
exclusive power of [water] disposition was lodged in the newly formed
states." 2 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 102.4, at 57 (1967). A
further justification for the doctrine is found in the fact that state constitutions declare water to be the property of the state (or something of
similar import). From this it is contended that Congress by admitting the
states entered into a binding compact giving the state constitution all the
authority conferred by an act of Congress. Farm. Invest. Co. v. Carpenter,
9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258 (1900). This theory is refuted in Trelease, Powers
and Rights of Various Levels of Government-States Rights v. National
Powers, 19 Wyo. L.J. 189, 199 (1965); thoroughly denounced in Goldberg,
Interposition-Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1, 11 (1964) ; and
demolished in Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts Over Western Waters-A
Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation", 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 423,
446 (1966).
20. 43 U.S.C. § 321 et. seq. (1964).
21. Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 253, 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1964). Act of July 9,

1870, 16 Stat. 218, 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1964).

22. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
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riparian lands on a nonnavigable stream "carried with it
as part of the granted estate the common law rights which
attach to riparian proprietorship." 23 The Court in deciding
against the party asserting riparian rights stated: "what
we hold is that following the act of 1877, if not before, all
nonnavigable waters then a part of the public domain became
publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated
"2 4 The Court thus held that the Desert Land Act
states ....
operated to sever the land from the water on the public
domain. It was made clear that a federal patentee derived
no rights to the use of water unless and until he complied
with applicable state law.
Proponents of the Colorado doctrine assert that this
severing of land and water constituted an irrevocable grant
of federal powers. However, it does not follow that "severance" of the water from the public domain also means "transfer" or "grant" of federal control. To destroy the power
of the federal government to control nonnavigable water
would have required such a grant or conveyance inasmuch
as the Court reasoned in terms of the original "control" or
"ownership" of the Government."3
There is nothing in Beaver Portlandthat is inconsistent
with federal proprietary claims to nonnavigable waters in
public land states following a priority system (as do the oil
shale states of Colorado, Utah and Wyoming). Beaver Portland merely stated that water on the public domain, originally
owned and controlled by the central government, had been
severed subject to divestiture into private hands through
compliance with state procedure. The Court nowhere indicated that the federal government could not subsequently
choose to establish federal procedures to allocate water rights.
Thus, the case most favorable to the position of those advocating the Colorado doctrine refutes the contention that federal
power over nonnavigable waters is nonexistent. Further, in
view of the many instances of federal recall of its power
over water as exemplified in the cases to be discussed below,
23. Id. at 154.
24. Id. at 163-64.
25. See, Morreale, supra note 19, at 439.
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the question of federal power over nonnavigable water
appears to be settled.
B. Nature and Scope of Reservation Doctrine
1. The Winters Doctrine
Because Congress had created the power of control in
the states it followed that Congress could dismember its
creature by reclaiming previously relinquished power.2" This
was accomplished in Winters v. United States" the leading
case establishing the right of the Government to reserve
water for public land reservations. Winters and subsequent
cases dealing with Indian reservations2 8 established that
although not mentioned in the treaties, executive orders, or
other means used to create land reservations, there is an
implied intent to reserve water in streams which rise upon,
traverse, or border Indian lands. The Court concluded that
Congress must have intended to deal fairly with the Indians
by reserving for them the water without which their land
would have been useless.2"
The Court in deciding Winters referred to dictum in
United States v. Rio GrandeDam and Irr.Co."0 which stated:
First,... in the absence of specific authority from
Congress a State cannot by its legislation destroy the
right of the United States, as the owner of lands
bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its
waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the
beneficial uses of the government property.8 '
26. The right of a state to receive compensation for the taking of "property"
which like unappropriated nonnavigable water is held open to appropriation
and use by the public is, at best, doubtful. See Goldberg, supra note 19,
at 22.
27. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
28. United States v. Conrad Inv. Co., 156 Fed. 123 (C.C.D. Mont. 1907), aff'd
161 Fed. 829 (9th Cir. 1908) ; United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104
F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Athanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d
321 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 988 (1957). See, Note, Indians,
Water, and the Arid Western States-A Prelude to the Pelton Decision,
5 UTAH L. REV. 495 (1957).
29. Although no mention was made of water in the legislative or executive
action establishing the Indian reservations in question, an implied reservation of the water necessary to beneficially use the property was found
because of the rule of interpretation of agreements with Indians which
resolves "ambiguities" from the standpoint of the Indians. This rule of
construction reflects the national "guilty conscience" associated with prior
dealings with the Indians.
80. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
31. Id. at 703.
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From this language it is evident that the reserved water rights
of the federal government have riparian right characteristics
and stem from the original ownership of western lands.
Winters rights might be explained as a unique result of
the unusual circumstances of the American Indian. However,
Arizona v. California2 regarded the principle underlying
Winters as being applicable to other types of reservations
even though no explanation for the reason for so holding
was offered. The Court in affirming the Winters doctrine
also decided that the implied reservation of water "was
intended to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of
the Indian reservation."" The end result is that all appropriations occurring subsequent to the date of the reservation
remain subordinate to the paramount, though dormant, right
of the United States to take water sufficient to meet the
future needs of the reservation. This exercise of the power
over nonnavigable water would appear to occur anytime
public land is reserved for a purpose that cannot be fulfilled
without a commensurate reservation of water.8 4 The withdrawal has the effect of recapturing the ownership85 of the
water.
32. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). There is no mention in the creating instruments of
water nor, it is to be supposed, did any of the parties involved ever
contemplate the question. One of the Indian reservations discussed in
Arizona v. California, the Colorado River Reservation located in Arizona
and California, was originally created by the Act of 1865 (13 Stat. 541,
559) which provided merely that:
all that part of the public domain in the Territory of Arizona, lying
west of a direct line from Half-Way bend to . . . the Colorado River,
containing about seventy-five thousand acres of land, shall be set
apart for an Indian reservation for the Indians of said river and its
tributaries.
This reservation was supplemented by executive orders issued Nov. 22,
1873; Nov. 16, 1874; May 15, 1876 and Exec. Order No. 2273 issued Nov.
22, 1915. None of the orders refer to the Indians right to, or need for,
water.
33. Id. at 600.
34. The decree in Arizona v. California quantified the water rights of some
reservations, but as to others, merely reserved water sufficient to effectuate
the purpose of the withdrawal, i.e., Havasu National Wildlife Refuge was
given a right to water "reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
Refuge . . . ." 376 U.S. 340, 346 (1964) (Emphasis supplied). See, Goldberg, Interposition Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1964)
where the author agrees that by reserving land the United States also
reserves the water necessary for its beneficial use.
35. For the difficulties inherent in using "ownership" and "title" concepts to
describe federal rights to water, see Trelease, Gover'nment Ownership and
Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. Rsv. 638 (1957). If ownership is
thought of in terms of the right to use or control water, rather than the
right of possession, the conceptual ambiguities are diminished.
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2. The Pelton Dam Case
The next appearance of the exercise of federal power
over nonnavigable water occurred in the Pelton Dam case."
This case which did not involve a consumptive use-it concerned federal power to license a power site located on land
withdrawn for power purposes-upheld the authority of the
FPC to license projects based upon "the ownership or control
by the U.S. of the reserved lands on which the licensed project
is to be located." 7 The holding that the FPC has exclusive
jurisdiction to license a power project to be erected on fast
lands reserved from the public domain for power purposes
is not an unwarranted encroachment into traditional state
control. The Court merely decided that a state should not
be allowed to prohibit power projects upon federal land with'drawn for such purposes when no consumptive use was
involved."8 The significance of Pelton lies in the ramifications
delineated by the interraction of the three propositions set
forth: (1) the United States has complete control over its
property under the property clause ;9 (2) the Desert Land
Act under which the states established their own systems
of water rights has no bearing on reservations ;4 and (3) as
to reserved lands the federal power to license the building
of dams is exclusive. From these propositions it would appear
that all federally owned land which is reserved, i.e., not
unqualifiedly subject to sale and disposition, being property
of the United States, is subject to plenary federal control.
This control extends to waters on reserved land since such
waters are also property of the federal government. As the
original owner of western land and water, the Government
has not relinquished ownership of land or water on reserved
land because the Desert Land Act applied only to public
land, i.e., land unqualifiedly subject to sale or disposition.
36. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
37. Id. at 442.
38. The Court in Pelton discussed the re-regulating dam that was to be employed and noted that water flow should be unaffected downstream. 349 U.S.
435,439 (1955).
39. Because the stream was nonnavigable, the authority of the FPC was based
on the property clause rather than the commerce clause (the constitutional
basis of government control over navigable waters). See First Iowa HydroElec. Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
40. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, supra note 36. The Court regarded
Oregons assertion that Beaver Portland had established state control of
nonnavigable waters as untenable because "the Desert Land Act covers
'sources of water supply upon the public lands * * *. The lands before us
in this case are not 'public lands' but 'reservations.' " Id. at 448.
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Having control or ownership of water on reserved lands
and having retained the power to divest itself of the right
to such water, the United States has rights superior to all
who "appropriate" water that in fact is not susceptible of
appropriation under state law because the United States
has not given states the power to create an appropriation.41
The foregoing was not expressly set forth in Pelton. It is
2
merely the logical result of the proposition advanced therein.
The courts have not articulated the precise scope of the
federal water right resulting from a reservation of public
land. In conjunction with Winters and Pelton there are,
however, later cases that appear to answer two significant
questions regarding the reservation doctrine. First, is it
necessary that the Government, in addition to the mere reservation of the land, indicate in some manner an intent to
reserve appurtenant water ? Second, the related question of
whether the Government reserves all water connected with
the reserved land or whether the water right is limited to
that amount needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation 7
3. The Fallbrook Public Utility District
The first of these cases, United States v. FallbrookPublic
Utility Dist.4" contains a lengthy discussion of the origin and
scope of federal rights in nonnavigable waters. This discussion, enlightened though it may be, was not necessary to a
decision in the case because the Government had stipulated
Although the state created "appropriation" is subordinate to the retained
control of the federal government, the appropriator will have a right
superior to later appropriators claiming under state law.
42. Morreale, supra note 19, at 440 contends that the application of the 1866,
1870, and 1877 legislation to public lands only, did not necessarily answer
the question whether reservation of land in and of itself is sufficient to
subject private appropriative rights to latent rights of the reservationa question not of constitutional power but of congressional intent. The
author indicates that it would be strange if the reservation of the land
itself did not also reserve the water. In Note, Federal State Conflicts Over
the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 967, 989 (1960) the
author advances two possible theories for the authority recognized in Pelton.
The first is essentially in line with the text material which this note supplements. The second advocates control as distinct from ownership, indicating
that withdrawal of federal land would revoke the control delegated to the
state by the Desert Land Act and return the control over water passing
through the reservation to the Government. The power might be limited
to water that actually reaches the enclave. The author concludes the theory,
finding that it would be strange if the Government lacked authority to
prevent the frustration of its projects by upstream users.
43. 165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
41.
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that it would litigate only its riparian rights as determined
to have belonged to its predecessor in title under California
law." The court analyzed the reservation doctrine stating
that the analogy of Pelton and Winters could not be extended
to hold that every time the Government acquires land or sets
it aside from the public domain it thereby acquires the right
to utilize water in disregard of state law.4" The court indicated that although the power of the federal government to
take unappropriated nonnavigable water for use on a military
reservation could not be gainsaid, it was necessary that Congress expressly indicate exercise of the power.
"Where Congress has intended that the federal government or its agencies take or use water rights, it has spoken
expressly-e.g. the power and reclamation projects [Pelton],
the matters of reserving Indian lands, etc." 4" Thus, Congress
can control unappropriated water and take it for use in
connection with military reservations but reserving or withdrawing or acquiring land is not ipso facto an indication of
congressional exercise of that power. This conceptualization
of federal reserved water rights has much to commend it.
The uncertainty of ascertaining when nonnavigable waters
have been reserved-the main criticism of the reservation
doctrine-would be lessened considerably by requiring a
definite unequivocal indication of congressional intent to
utilize its power over water."
It is to be remembered that Fallbrook accepted federal
rights to water that actually reached the reservation but
demanded an express exercise of governmental power to
subordinate other stream users to federal rights. 8 The court
indicated that the power projects, reclamation projects, and
Indian reservations were examples of the necessary additional indication of an intention to reserve water. In the
power project situation (Pelton) Congress had in the Federal
44. Id. at 832.
45. Id. at 838.
46. Id. at 846.
47. The significance of the Fallbrook decision is diminished because the statement regarding the reservation doctrine was dictum.
48. United States v. Fallbrook Public Utility Dist., 165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal.
1958).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1968

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 3 [1968], Iss. 1, Art. 4

86

LAND AND WATRm LAW REVIEW

Vol. III

Power Act 4" and other public land laws"0 empowered an
executive agency to exercise the general power of the Government. Similarly, Indian reservations were created by acts
of Congress, treaties, or by statutes authorizing the Secretary
of the Interior to set aside the lands as reservations." The
court's objection in Fallbrook was that nowhere could a
delegation of power be found in regard to Camp Pendleton.
The Government had merely condemned the property and
made additional appropriations from time to time. There
had occurred no delegation of general federal power to the
Navy or any other agency that allowed it to take unappropriated water to the extent of affecting other stream users.
In essence, the court in seeking congressional authorization
was acknowledging the distinction between "acquired" and
"reserved" lands.5" Reservations of public domain will
normally occur under circumstances that comply with the
additional indication of congressional intent the court required, while Government acquisition of private land would
not.
4. The Hawthorne Case

The next case involving the reservation doctrine, the
Hawthorne3 case, was decided in the federal district of
Nevada nineteen days after Fallbrook. There Nevada demanded that the United States secure a state permit before
withdrawing underground percolating water by means of
49. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825 (1964).
50. 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1964) authorizes the President to withdraw lands for water
power, irrigation and other purposes. 43 U.S.C. § 148 (1964) allows the
Secretary of the Interior to withdraw lands in Indian reservations for
power and other purposes.
51. United States v. Fallbrook Public Utility District, 165 F. Supp 806, 845
(S.D. Cal. 1958).
52. The court recognized the distinction in spite of language to the contrary,
Id. at 833.
[T]o illustrate the fine line of distinction between obtaining a proprietary right under' state law on unreserved lands, i.e., previously
private lands, and claiming a sovereign right on reserved lands as in
the Hawthorne case [see infra note 53 and accompanying text] let me
point out that in late 1961 the 12th Naval District filed an application
to appropriate ground water for military purposes on their large
naval air base near Fallon, Nev., about 60 miles from Hawthorne. This
base was established during World War II and the land purchased from
private owners. The reservation doctrine did not apply here.
Hearings on S. 1275 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 190 (1964) (Testimony of Hugh
Shamberger, President of the National Reclamation Assoc.)
53. Nevada ex. rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev.
1958).
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wells drilled on land that had been reserved for military use
from the public domain. The court held that Pelton was
determinative, thus obviating the necessity for naval compliance with state law. It should be noted that the use in
Hawthornewas consumptive"4 and involved using water relied
upon by the citizens of an adjoining town. Under the court's
holding the Navy cannot be required to share the water
supply.
Unlike Fallbrook,the court in Hawthorne did not discuss
the need for congressional action that would indicate an
intent to reserve water. The court apparently regarded the
act of reserving the land for military purposes as sufficient
evidence of an intent to exercise federal power. The court
reasoned that the Government owned the land, thereby subjecting the water to federal control that had not been delegated to the state by the Desert Land Act which is inapplicable to reserved land. Again, the decision suffered from
the same affliction as did Fallbrook, the federal reserved
water 'discussion was dictum."
5. Arizona v. California
Arizona v. California." although dealing with navigable
water, has further clarified the nature and scope of the water
rights established upon the creation of a federal reservation.
The Court was faced inter alia with the question of Government rights to water for Indian, national forest, national
recreation areas, and wildlife refuge reservations. In holding
that the Government did have prior perfected rights which
were effective as of the time the reservations were created,
the basis for finding congressional exercise of its power to
reserve water was analyzed in connection with the Indian
reservations but as to other types of reservations the Court
was content merely to uphold the Master's finding that:
the principle underlying the reservation of water
rights for Indian Reservations was equally applicable to other federal establishments such as National
54. In the course of the opinion it is apparent that the extension of Pelton to
encompass consumptive uses was made without the slightest difficulty.
65. On appeal the court stated that it was unnecessary to decide which sovereign
entity had control since the United States had not consented to suit. Nevada
ex. rel. Shamberger v. United States, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
56. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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Recreation Areas and National Forests. We agree
...

that the United States intended to reserve water

sufficient for the future requirements of the Lake
Mead National Recreation Area, the Havasu NationWildlife
al Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial National
Refuge and the Gila National Forest. 7
In formulating the final decree establishing the amount and
priority dates of the various reservations, the Court provided
that each reservation was to have rights to enough water
to accomplish the purpose of the reservation-no more, no
less. 8
The reasoning underlying federal power to reserve nonnavigable streams is inapplicable to navigable waters because
of the historical distinction between 'dominium over nonnavigable and imperium over navigable waters."9 However,
what is relevant here is that the Court upheld the constitutionality of water reservations and in doing so clarified
the type of water right-whether navigable or nonnavigable
water is involved-that adheres to federal withdrawals. The
federal right as set forth in Arizona v. California is for a
quantity of water sufficient to accomplish the purpose of
the land reservation. The water right resembles a riparian
right in that it does not require actual beneficial use; but,
like an appropriation, it has a priority 'date"0 and has been
(in many instances) reduced to a specific quantity.
6.

Ashley National Forest

The present status of federal reserved water rights is
aptly illustrated in Glenn v. United States. 1 The facts as
stipulated were that the United States diverted water to the
57. Id. at 601 (Emphasis supplied).
58. Each federal claim for water was given water sufficient to maintain the
reservation. Some rights were qualified on the basis of forecast prospective need while others were given a right to water "reasonably necessary
to fulfill the purpose" of the reservation. See, note 34 supra and accompanying text.
59. See 2 R. Clark, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 102.4, at 67-71 (1967) for a
discussion of the distinction between navigable and nonnavigable water.
60. Both Winters and Arizona v. California established the priority as of the
land reservation. Pelton was careful to note that there was no interference
with vested rights thereby implying that private rights acquired prior to
a federal withdrawal will be protected. Accord: R. CLARx, supra note 59 at
82; Meyer, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 66 (1966); Goldberg,
Interposition-Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1, 19 (1964); and
Note, Federal Water Rights Legislation and the Reserved Lands Controversy, 53 GEO. L.J. 750, 768 (1965).
61. Civil No. C-153-61, D. Utah, March 16, 1963.
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Ashley National Forest-an 1897 reservation-in derogation
of an appropriation with a state assigned priority date of
1933. The United States' right of diversion was not based
upon state law. The court 'dismissed the complaint subject
to the right to reinstitute the action "based upon rights, if
any, acquired by diversion and use, if any occurred, prior
the date when the Ashley National
to February 22, 1897,
62
Forest was created."
7. Summary of the Reservation Doctrine
As the foregoing cases indicate, the mere creation of a
reservation on the public domain is sufficient to reserve
at least the water thereon that is needed to effectuate the
purpose of the land reservation. Winters in holding that
the Government must have intended to reserve water so as
to facilitate irrigation among the Indians relied on the
statement in Rio Grande"' that the Government has a right
to water bordering its land at least to the extent necessary
for the beneficial use of the land. This is clearly indicative
of the fact that the United States has a right to use waters
flowing on reserved land merely because the land is reserved
and the water is necessary to accomplish the purpose for
which the reservation was created.
Hawthorne, and to a lesser extent Fallbrook, support
Winters by indicating that when public land is withdrawn
to establish a military reservation, the Government has a
right to the unabridged use of all waters traversing the
reservation in order to supply the needs of the military for
whom the reservation was created. Pelton especially as interpreted by Hawthorne, also impliedly stands for the proposition that water appurtenant to land reserved for power sites,
is reserved to the extent necessary to generate the power
for which the reservation was created.
Arizona v. California in affirming Winters, found that
Congress had manifest an intent to reserve water for Indian
use. The Court indicated that the creation of a reservation
62. Id. The court determined that the appropriation was necessary to supply
a recreation area within the reservation rendering use of the water necessary to effectuate the purpose of the withdrawal. See Note, supra note 60,
at 767.
63. See text accompanying note 31 8upra.
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is indicative of an intent to reserve the water needed to
effectuate the purpose of the reservation. 4 Thus an intent
to reserve water was required and found to be satisfied by
the very nature of the withdrawal itself. Arizona v. California
further supports the contention that the federal right is
determined by the inherent nature of the reservation. The
Court summarily stated that the principle underlying Winters
applies to all federal reservations of land in the public
domain.
There are broad statements and logical inferences in
Pelton and Hawthorne that could be interpreted to support
a finding that the water reserved includes all the water
appurtenant to the withdrawn land whether or not necessary
to accomplish the purpose for which the reservation was
created. Hawthorne noted that the Desert Land Act having
been interpreted in Pelton as being inapplicable to water on
reserved lands, necessarily meant that the control over such
water had been reclaimed by the Government from the states.
Since the Government has complete control it follows that
all the water can be reserved. However, having power over
all nonnavigable water does not compel utilization of all
such power. Fallbrook very pointedly distinguished between
power and congressional exercise of that power. It is axiomatic that by reserving land for a military reservation,
power site, or an Indian reservation, Congress intends to
accomplish the purpose for which the land reservation is
made and not any other purpose. Congress in considering
legislation or an executive agency contemplating action, 'does
not consider all possible future uses that may be made of
land that is to be withdrawn. Consequently, the withdrawal
should not be taken as an indication that Congress or an
executive agency is omnipotent and has reserved all the
water on such land that may be used at anytime in the future
for any of numerous unforeseen purposes. By withdrawing
public lands for use as a bombing range, Congress should
certainly not be taken as having indicated an intention to
reserve all the water appurtenant to the land to be bombarded. No water would be needed to effectuate the purpose
64. The Indian reservation cases, eupra note 28, all have sought and found
congressional intent to reserve water as manifest by the purpose for which

the withdrawal was made.
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of the withdrawal. Congress most assuredly would not have
considered that its act of withdrawing the land would be
construed as creating a reservation of water. Thus, Congress
should be taken to have exercised its power over water only
to the extent necessary to fulfill the purpose of the land
withdrawal."5
In Winters the Court found a reservation of water because Congress must have intended to accomplish the purpose
of the reservation which required that the Indians be allowed
the use of water. In Pelton the only use of water considered
was that necessary to accomplish the purpose of the power
site reservation. 6 Similarly, in Hawthorne and Fallbrook
no mention was made of the right to water apart from that
needed to fulfill the military's needs. Finally, in Arizona
v. California the Court in considering the water rights of
Indians, recreation areas, and other reservations, unequivocally limited the water right to that amount needed to effectuate the purpose of the withdrawals. In short, the foregoing
cases establish that the federal government has the power
to reserve all nonnavigable water contiguous with the public
land but by creating a reservation it withdraws only that
amount of water consistent with the purpose sought to be
accomplished by the withdrawals of the land. Glenn v. United
States specifically indicates that the federal water right has
a priority date with subsequent state appropriations being
subordinate to the federal right to take water reasonably
necessary for reservation purposes. This is in accord with
Arizona v. Californiawhere the Court decree67 granted each
reservation water rights having a priority as of the date of
the creation of the reservation. The Court granted sufficient
water to meet not only the present but the future needs of the
reservation as well.68
65. Accord: Note, FederalState Conflicts Over the Control of Western Waters,
60 COLUM. L. REV. 967, 995-96 (1960) and 2 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 107.2 at 102 (1967). The position in CLARK is not clearly deliniated but in stating that appropriations subsequent to the date of the reservation are subject to the amount of water reserved, the implication is that
all nonnavigable water contiguous with the reserved land has not been
withdrawn, but rather, only that amount needed to effectuate the reservation purpose.
66. The right to water for the power site was not expressly set forth in Pelton
because the use was non-consumptive and a re-regulating dam was to be
installed. See, supra note 88.
67. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
68. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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Thus the evolution of the reservation doctrine has established the following propositions:
(1) the federal reserved water right extends to both
consumptive and non-consumptive uses.
(2) the reserved water right does not depend upon
application to a beneficial use, but rather arises when the
reservation is established and remains available as long as
the land reservation is in existence.
(3) State created water rights vested prior to creation
of the federal reservation have a superior priority date
making such rights compensable if subsequently taken for
the reservation. Rights acquired after the reservation are
subordinate and there need be no compensation for their
taking.
(4) The quantity of water available is that amount
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose for which
the reservation was created. This requires a consideration
of both the present and future needs of the reservation.

II.

FEDERAL OIL SHALE LANDS

As previously noted, federally owned oil shale land
contains 79 percent of the oil shale located in Colorado, Utah
and Wyoming.6 9 This land was withdrawn from the public
domain by executive orders issued in 1916, 1924, and 1930.0
As a result, the question arises as to whether the reservation
doctrine can be applied to justify a finding that the withdrawal of the land operated to reserve the water thereon.
To answer this question, this study will apply the doctrine
to the oil shale withdrawal orders in an attempt to ascertain
the doctrine's applicability.
69. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
70. Exec. Order No. 5327 (April 15, 1930). See supra note 14 and accompanying text as to naval reserves. Executive orders of December 6, 1916 created
the Colorado and Utah Naval Oil Shale Reserves and executive order of
September 27, 1924 created Colorado Naval Oil Shale Reserve No. 2. The
latter order read as follows:
It is hereby ordered that, subject to any valid existing claim and
in so far as title thereto remains in the United States, the land hereinafter described be, and the same are hereby, withdrawn from settlement, location, sale or entry, and held for the exclusive use and benefit
of the United States Navy, for the development of Naval Oil Shale
Reserve No. 1, Colorado No. 1, until the order is revoked by the
President or by Congress ....
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A. Federal Water Rights
The courts have applied the reservation doctrine in
numerous situations involving various types of land withdrawals. Under the Winters doctrine the creation of Indian
reservations operated to reserve water because of the implied
intent to deal fairly with the Indians. The fact that the acts,
treaties, or orders creating the reservations made no mention
of water rights was of little significance. 7 The Winters
doctrine compels an analysis of the purpose of the land
withdrawal as the only means of ascertaining whether federal
water rights have been reserved. Similarly, in the Pelton
Dam case the recognition of federal water rights did not
result from the language in the orders creating the reservation, 2 but rather was the result of congressional and executive intent inferred from the purpose of the reservation.
Accordingly, Pelton like Winters requires that the purpose
of the land withdrawal be studied in order to determine
whether governmental power has been exercised to create
federal water rights.
The reservation in Hawthorne also was created by an
executive order that made no mention of water rights.73 The
order merely provided that the land was withdrawn for the
exclusive use and benefit of the Navy for the development
of an ammunition depot.7 The court turned, perhaps unknowingly, to the purpose of the land withdrawal and found
that in order to effectuate that purpose it was necessary
that water have been reserved. Although it did not involve
the creation of a reservation through the usual means of setting aside land from the public domain, the dicta in Fallbrook
also confirms the need to find an intent to reserve water
71. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
72. Power Site Reserve No. 66 involved in Pelton was created pursuant to
Exec. Order No. 1223.17 (July 2, 1910). The order in its entirety was as
follows: "Power Site Reserves Nos. 43-74 created, in Montana and Oregon."
Obviously, no mention of water rights occurred.
73. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
74. The order creating the depot stated:
[I]t is hereby ordered that, subject to any valid existing claims and
in so far as title thereto remains in the United States, the lands hereinafter described be, and the same are hereby withdrawn from settlement, location, sale, entry, and all forms of appropriation and held
for the exclusive use and benefit of the United States Navy for the
development of and use as an ammunition depot, until this order is
revoked by the President or Congress.
Exec. Order No. 4351 (October 27, 1926).
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before an exercise of federal power may be inferred. 5 However, the most unequivocal statement of the scope of the
reservation doctrine occurs in Arizona v. California"' where
water was held to be reserved for wildlife refuges, national
forests, recreation areas, and Indian reservations because
the purpose of reserving the land could only be accomplished
through the use of water. As did Winters, Pelton, Hawthorne
and Fallbrook,Arizona v. Californiaindicates that the answer
to the question of whether the reservation of public domain
operates to reserve water must be sought in an analysis of
the purpose for which the reservation was created.
Glenn v. United States"' in vindicating a diversion by
the Government found that the use of the water was consistent
with the purpose sought to be accomplished by the creation
of the national forest. In so doing, the court implicitly summarized the reasoning of the foregoing cases and indicated
the procedure that will be followed in deciding future questions of federal water rights. The court will first determine
whether the reservation occurred prior to the acquisition
of the water right by the private appropriator. If so, it then
becomes necessary to analyze the action creating the reservation. If no mention were made of federal water rights,
the court will then inquire into the purpose sought to be
accomplished in creating the reservation. Should the purpose
involved be one that cannot be effectuated without the use
of water, then as the preceding cases indicate, an intention to
reserve water will have been manifested.
B. Application of the Reservation Doctrine
1. Oil Shale Withdrawal
Utilizing the aforementioned process of deciding the
applicability of the reservation doctrine to a federal land
withdrawal, it becomes apparent that the withdrawal of oil
shale bearing land from the public domain did not result in
the reservation of water for its 'development.
First, the executive order withdrawing oil shale from
the public domain did not refer in any way to water rights.
75. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
77. Civil No. C-153-61, D. Utah, March 16, 1963.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss1/4

20

Hillhouse: The Federal Reserved Water Doctrine - Application to the Problem

'1968

COMMENTS

The order merely stated that all federally owned oil shale
lands were temporarily withdrawn from lease or other disposal." Obviously, if federal water rights are to be asserted
in regard to the withdrawn shale land, it cannot be done on
the basis of the language in the withdrawal order.
Because of the absence of reference to water in the withdrawal order, it becomes necessary to ascertain the purpose
sought to be accomplished by reserving oil shale land. The
order stated that the land was temporarily withdrawn for
purposes of investigation, examination and classification.
As one author has stated:
Now, whether the 1930 order [Exec. Order No. 5327]
was in furtherance of a farseeing conservation policy,
or a retreat from a vexing administrative problem
is open to some question in my mind as I have looked
in the record.
Certain it is that in the years prior to 1930, the
Department had a belly full of the problems of oil
shale, and a general withdrawal order seems, in
retrospect, to have been amply justified on that
basis alone."s
Whether the motivation behind the oil shale withdrawals
was to avoid perplexing administrative problems or to effectuate conservation measure, it is clear that the land was not
reserved in order to allow the Government to develop oil shale
in commercial quantities. By withdrawing land in order to
examine and classify it, the Government stated its objective
in terms not susceptible of enlargement. Classification of oil
shale lands involves geological determination of the character
of the shale located within the withdrawn land. Once the
Government has examined and classified the land the manifest purpose of Exec. Order No. 5327 has been accomplished.
78. The order stated:
Under authority and pursuant to the provisions of the act of
Congress approved June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 847), as amended by the
act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 497), it is hereby ordered that subject
to valid existing rights the deposits of oil shale, and lands containing
such deposits owned by the United States, be, and the same are hereby,
temporarily withdrawn from lease or other disposal and reserved for
the purposes of investigation, examination, and classification.
This order shall continue until revoked by the President or by
act of Congress.
Exec. Order No. 5327 (April 15, 1930).
79. Hearings on Oil Shale Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1965) (Statement of John A. Carver,
Under Secretary of the Interior).
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Thereafter any further federal activity involving oil shale
land will require an additional indication of the exercise
of governmental power.
Having in mind the purpose of the oil shale withdrawal,
the next step in ascertaining whether water was reserved by
the withdrawal order involves the determination of whether
water was needed to effectuate that purpose.
Without describing the technical aspects of geological
classification of minerals, suffice it to say that vast quantities
of water are not required."0 A national forest requires water
to nourish the vegetation. A recreation area requires water
for human sustenance and enjoyment. A water power site
inherently involves water as an energy source. A military
reservation normally requires water to maintain equipment
and personnel. A wildlife refuge by its very nature needs
water to sustain the object to be protected. However, the
classification of minerals requires only that limited quantity
of water needed for geological procedure. There is not implied
in the objective of classifying land as to mineral content,
a further objective or purpose to develop the land once it has
been classified. Accordingly, the reservation doctrine cannot
be invoked to provide water for the development of oil shale
until there has been an additional in/dication of federal intent
to exercise control over water.
In brief, the order withdrawing oil shale to facilitate
classification, also operated to reserve water needed to effectuate that purpose. Because classification does not include
development, the reservation doctrine cannot be invoked
as a basis for holding that Exec. Order No. 5327 operated
to reserve the water necessary for the development of oil
shale. In this regard, the oil shale withdrawal is analogous
to a reservation of public domain to create a bombing range.
Establishment of the bombing range is sufficient to reserve
only the water needed to facilitate bombardment of the land.
If water were desired to satisfy the needs of a propose'd
ammunition depot on the same land, water would not be
reserved until an executive order or other federal action
80. Minerals classification involves

surface mapping. U.S.

core drilling, surface examination, and
No. 537, The Classifica-

DEPT. OF INTERIOR, BULL.

tion of Public Lands 50 (1913).
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were undertaken to indicate that the Government intended to
exercise its power over adjacent streams by withdrawing
the land for depot purposes. Consequently, if the Government needs water to develop the oil shale land presently
withdrawn for purposes of classification, it will be necessary
to manifest such intent by means of an executive order or
similar action. After issuance of the new federal mandate,
subsequent appropriators will take water subject to the
paramount right of the Government. At the present time,
however, all state created appropriations in oil shale areas
have a right to water that must be compensated if taken
to meet the needs of oil shale development.
2. Naval Oil Shale Reserves
Applying the reservation 'doctrine to the lands reserved
for the Navy results in the opposite conclusion that sufficient
water has been reserved to develop oil shale. The executive
orders creating the naval oil shale reserves in Colorado and
Utah provided that the public lands embraced therein should
be held for the exclusive use or benefit of the United States
Navy. 1 It should be noted that the language used in creating
the naval oil shale reserves is nearly identical to the wording
employed to establish the ammunition depot involved in the
Hawthorne case. 2
Although the orders creating the oil shale reserves did
not refer to water, the purpose of the reserve is clearly to
provide for the future fuel needs of the Navy. The Secretary
of the Navy is authorized to explore, prospect, conserve,
develop, use and operate naval petroleum reserves in his
discretion. 3 At the present time, however, no authority exists
for the development of the oil shale by the Navy.8 4 The
81. Oil Shale Reserve No. 1 (Colorado No. 1) was reserved December 6, 1916
and designated 44,560 acres of public land as a naval petroleum reserve.
A subsequent executive order dated June 12, 1919 restored to the public
domain some 3,880 acres originally withdrawn. Accordingly, Reserve No. 1
now comprises 41,353 acres. Oil Shales Reserve No. 2 (Utah No. 1) was
reserved by an executive order of December 6, 1916 and now comprises
91,464 acres. Oil Shale Reserve No. 3 (Colorado No. 2) was established
by an executive order of September 27, 1924 to facilitate development of
Oil Shale Reserve No. 1. The order read as follows:
The lands hereinafter described be, and the same are hereby, withdrawn
from settlement, location, sale, or entry, and held for the exclusive use
and benefit of the United States Navy ....
82. See supra note 74.

83. 10 U.S.C. § 7422 (1964).
84. 10 U.S.C. § 7438 (1964).
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Secretary of the Interior has been granted authority over
the experimental demonstration facility near Rifle, Colorado
and is authorized to proceed with the development of oil
shale.85 However, it is provided that the delegation to the
Department of the Interior shall not be construed "in dimunition of the responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy in
providing oil shale and products therefrom for needs of
national defense." 8 This last statement is indicative of the
overall purpose of the oil shale reserves which is to provide
fuel for national defense. Accordingly, the tpurpose of providing fuel for national defense requires that the shale be
developed.
Because a reservation of land from the public domain
operates to reserve the water needed to effectuate the purpose
of the reservation it is clear that the creation of the naval
oil shale reserves had the effect of reserving the water needed
to develop fuel for the Navy from the reserved shale. Hence,
appropriations on the Colorado, Green and White Riversall of which traverse naval oil shale reserves-which have a
priority dated subsequent to December 6, 1916 are subordinate
to the right of the Government to take the water needed to
develop the naval reserves.8 7 Consequently, any state appropriation after 1916 can be taken by the federal government
without necessitating the payment of compensation.

III. PUBLIC PoucY CONSImERTIONS
Having proceeded through an analysis of the reservation
doctrine and having applied it to oil shale withdrawals and
reserves, it is appropriate to examine the conclusions reached.
This study has concluded that the oil shale withdrawal of
1930 did not operate to reserve water while the naval oil
shale reserves of 1916 through 1924, did result in the setting
aside of sufficient water to produce oil from shale. The
85. 10 U.S.C. § 7438 (1964).
86. Id.
87. The fact that the Government has not yet empowered the Secretary of the
Navy to develop the oil shale can have no effect upon the question of water
rights reservation. The relevant inquiry is to ascertain the effect of the
executive orders creating the reserves and the purpose sought to be accomplished. Although the Government may not take advantage of its rights
to water, one of the characteristics of the federal reserved water doctrine
is the lack of a need for the appropriation of the water to a beneficial
use in order to preserve the right.
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question remains as to whether the conclusions reached can
be justified from a public policy standpoint.
The ultimate goal of water law is to maximize the net
benefits derived from the utilization of a scarce resourcewater.88 Public policy is best served if the law encourages
the utilization of water to accomplish maximum benefits
with minimum costs. Only then can law be said to fulfill
its function of ordering society so that the greatest number
of people can enjoy the greatest benefits. The maximization
principle has attained such Wide acceptance that the Government has adopted it as the policy to be followed in evaluating
federal water projects.8 9 In developing resources the Government seeks to provide the maximum net benefits. This requires a computation of social benefits to be weighed against
costs to ascertain the net result. In considering costs, the
Government includes losses and induced adverse effects
(opportunity costs) irrespective of ultimate compensation
for such losses.
Under the Government's adopted theory of maximization, the conclusion that water was not reserved for oil shale
is a desirable result. The conclusion that water rights were
reserved for the 'development of naval oil shale reserves is
not. According to the maximum benefits theory, if the Government needs water for development of federally owned
oil shale and the only water available is being used for the
irrigation of farms, then the loss of the irrigation use is a
cost of developing oil shale. It is a loss or induced adverse
effect or an opportunity cost 9" whether it is borne by the
Government or not."' It should be noted that as a practical
matter it will not be the Government that will bear the significant costs of water acquisition. Utilizing normal procedure for oil development, the Government as landowner
88. See generally, Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulations, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1 (1965).
89. Trelease, Powers and Rights of Various Levels of Government-States
Rights vs. National Powers, 19 WYo. L.J. 159, 201 (1955) citing, Policies,
Standards, and Procedures in the Formulation, Evaluation, and Review of
Plans for the Use and Development of Water and Land Resources, prepared under the direction of the President's Water Resources Council
in 1962.
90. An opportunity cost is "the loss of values that could be produced and added
to national wealth, but that are forgone because the insecurity of the water
rights has frightened away the potential water user." Id. at 201.
91. For an enlightened discussion of this problem see, supra note 89, at 200-202.
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will lease the land to a lessee who will absorb all operating
costs while paying a royalty to the lessor. The amount or
percentage of the royalty should be only slightly effected
by the fact that water is, or is not, an expense. It is the
bargaining power of the Government that will determine the
size of the landowner's royalty which is not a cost-bearing
interest. Thus, in reality, it will be the oil company, as
lessee, that will benefit from an application of the reservation
doctrine to the acquisition of water for oil shale development.
Because the cost is there, the only question is who should
pay it. Should it be the Government, representing the taxpayers of the United States who benefit from the federal
project, or one farmer who is made to sacrifice all in the
name of the public welfare.
It has been said, that to require the United States to
purchase water that it has previously given away, would
render many projects economically infeasible. 2 This would
result, it is maintained in a net loss to the general public
because the cost of necessary government projects would be
prohibitive. The same applies to western land that was
originally "given away" to those complying with homesteading procedures. Yet the land, like the water used to make it
productive, has increased the gross national product and
enhanced the general welfare for decades. If either the land
or the water is taken for use in the development of oil shale,
the gross national product will be diminished. If the cost of
purchasing the land or water is prohibitive it can only be
so because its use in growing crops is more valuable than its
use in producing oil shale. If that is the case, the policy of
maximization requires that oil shale not be developed. The
project would not increase benefits but would lessen them,
a result desirable to no one.
A leading authority on water law offers an example98
from the private sector of the economy that aptly illustrates
the crux of the problem i.e., compensation for private invest92. Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., 57 (1964) (Testimony of Ramsay
Clark, then Assistant Attorney General of the United States for public
lands).
93. Trelease, Powers and Rights of Various Levels of Government-States
Rights vs. National Powers, 19 WYO. L.J. 189, 201 (1965).
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ments made in reliance on water rights. The situation involves
an irrigator atid a manufacturer competing for the same
limited supply of water. Both seek to increase their use
of the water. Assuming the manufactured goods are worth
more than the irrigated crops, the manufacturer can purchase
the irrigator's water by paying him more than the crops
are worth. However, if there were a social policy favoring
agriculture that would enable the farmer to appropriate
all the water without paying for it, the additional crops
produced would be less valuable than the forgone manuwould be decreased, the country
factured goods. "Welfare
4
rich.'
less
would be
IDV. CONCLUSION

In concluding that the Government reserved water for
of naval oil shale reserves and not for oil
development
the
shale withdrawn from the public domain in 1930, the results of
this study present a situation that is only partially beneficial to the general welfare. If appropriated water is to
be taken from its present users, the oil shale producer, who
will probably be an oil company lessee, should include its
cost in determining the desirability of his project. The cost
exists, like any other cost of doing business, and will not
vanish merely because it is ignored. The need to compensate
those who have invested in reliance upon state created water
rights,9 5 arises not because of a sentimental attachment to
states rights, "but because it is in accord with the very
policy officially adopted by the agencies of the United States
and approved by the President.""8
The appropriators on the rivers and streams traversing
naval oil shale reserves are subject, perhaps unknowingly,
to a "floating mortgage in the sky"9 7 which when finally
foreclosed by the United States will deprive them of their
water and investments based on water rights, without even
the slightest compensation. The reservation doctrine is a
selfish doctrine much too rigid and wasteful to tolerate. Be94. Id.
95. Mr. Glenn in Glenn v. United States, supra, note 77, is an example of one
who was required to lay his costly sacrifice on the altar of the public good.
96. See supra note 93, at 202.
97. Northcutt Ely, 1964 Senate Hearings, aupra note 92, at 246.
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cause the federal government has reserved an unspecified
amount of water for naval oil shale development which may
be initiated at some unforseeable time in the future, there is
no security in "vested" water rights obtained subsequent to
the creation of the naval reserve. It is impossible for state
planners and individual appropriators to ascertain how much
water remains for non-federal projects. Must this vitally
scarce resource be wasted pending the time that claimed
federal water rights be ultimately utilized. If there is to
continue to be growth in the areas affected the answer must
be a resounding-NO!
RICHARD A. HILLHOUSE
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